Washington, DC – Representatives Gregory W. Meeks, Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, sent a letter to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick raising concerns over reports that the Department of Commerce may withdraw from critical multilateral agreements aimed at restricting access to critical technologies, like semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME). The Members warned Secretary Lutnick that abandoning coordinating efforts with partners would make it harder to prevent the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from accessing cutting-edge technology and undermine America’s national security. 
 
The full text of the letter can be found below. A PDF copy of the letter can be found here.  

Dear Secretary Lutnick,

We are concerned by recent reports indicating the Department of Commerce may seek to pull back from critical multilateral agreements and engagements with allies and partners that are designed to coordinate policies to restrict the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from accessing cutting-edge technologies. While it’s important to prevent U.S. technology from powering the PRC’s military, a coordinated approach with partners and allies is necessary in critical technology areas such as advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), to prevent the PRC from developing critical capabilities that are detrimental to our national security. 

To ensure the United States continues to outpace the PRC on semiconductors and SME, we have worked on a bipartisan basis to facilitate a domestic innovation and manufacturing ecosystem while controlling our adversary’s ability to access advanced technologies. We helped to pass the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, sweeping legislation that sought to reinvigorate U.S. leadership in science and technology and included an investment of $52.7 billion designed to help reshore U.S. semiconductor manufacturing capacity. We also recognize the need for a defensive strategy to protect our economic and national security. Both the Trump and Biden Administrations have placed restrictions on PRC entities from purchasing certain high-end semiconductor chips and SME technologies.  We believe these export controls were necessary and remain so.

However, U.S. export controls alone are not sufficient because other countries also manufacture advanced semiconductors and associated equipment and tools that they can sell to the PRC. While the previous administration achieved some success with multilateral agreements with the Netherlands and Japan on certain SME controls,  those controls would have been far more successful in constraining the PRC if they were coordinated from the start. To this day these trilateral controls remain misaligned in key ways, from a lack of end use controls to different approaches to the denial of licensing.

We recognize that organizing these coalitions can be challenging, but working with allies and partners achieves real results. The United States assembled a coalition of nearly 40 nations to coordinate controls against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We urge you to continue to engage with our partners and allies to build a similar coalition focused on the PRC. This can only be accomplished through direct and sustained diplomacy, which while not always as fast as we would like, is the only effective option in the long competition with the PRC.

The Commerce Department has an opportunity to demonstrate strength and support the U.S. manufacturing base by coordinating more plurilateral controls, not less. With Russia stalling progress in the four large multilateral regimes, we urge you to seek out small coalitions of countries that have market-share in particular critical technology sectors. In the case of semiconductors, for instance, we should be broadening coordination beyond Japan and the Netherlands to include South Korea, Taiwan, and others. Initiatives and fora, such as the Multilateral Action on Sensitive Technologies (MAST) and the U.S.-E.U. Trade and Technology Council (TTC), can help advance such coordination while furthering U.S. global leadership and interests on standards development, technology transfer, trade, and many other multinational issues.

We are worried that if the United States goes it alone or attempts to bully our partners, they will increasingly hedge to the PRC instead of working with the United States. Disengaging from multilateral dialogues and initiatives could provide an excuse for key governments not to cooperate with our controls. In response to President Trump’s tariffs, President Ursula von der Leyen of the European Commission has called for strengthening European-PRC relations.  In March, the Dutch company ASML announced it would be building a facility in China—a decision that runs counter to U.S. interests and could only have been made with European government support.  Last month, the PRC engaged in its first multilateral economic dialogue with Japan and South Korea in five years—seeking a regional partnership among the three nations to weather the trade policies of the United States.

Finally, we caution against a unilateral approach that overly relies upon the foreign direct product rule (FDPR) to extend U.S. jurisdiction to foreign-produced items. While the Department should continue to exercise this authority as a last resort, abuse of the rule may further weaken our standing with allies and partners and result in the removal of U.S. suppliers from major global supply chains in the long run, which would be disastrous for our economy and our ability to outcompete the PRC on critical technologies. A better path would be to coordinate controls with other partners and help them build enforcement capacity, so the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) does not have to monitor and police millions of transactions alone. We would be willing partners in ensuring that BIS has the tools and resources to make U.S. controls more effective.

We are deeply concerned about the harms that will occur to U.S. interests if the United States walks away from multilateral approaches. We urge the Department to continue multistakeholder dialogues to bring our allies along in aligning their export controls with ours, using appropriate leverage available to you. Given the critical importance of this matter to both domestic and foreign affairs, we request that you provide us answers to the following questions by June 5, 2025:

• What is the Department’s current policy with regards to participation in multilateral councils and forums, including MAST, TTC, multilateral agreements, and plurilateral agreements such as the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral agreement?
• What steps is the Department taking to coordinate with our allies and partners on export controls on critical technologies, such as semiconductors and SME?
• To what extent will the Department continue to take into account foreign availability as it designs and coordinates its controls?
• What additional staffing, resources, or authorities does the Department need to more effectively coordinate with partners on controls on technology entering the PRC market?

We would appreciate a briefing from your staff to better understand how you are approaching these questions.