

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#1)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The Administration's FY 2020 budget request would provide \$4.9 billion in State Department- and USAID-administered bilateral assistance specifically for Africa, an 11% reduction from the FY 2019 request and 31% decrease compared to actual allocations in FY 2018 (excluding Food for Peace aid, which the Administration proposes to end entirely). **How do these proposals reflect the Administration's stated priorities for the region, such as countering strategic competition from China and Russia, advancing U.S. trade and economic ties, and countering Islamist terrorism and other armed conflicts?**

Answer:

The request advances commercial ties with nations across the region to benefit both the United States and Africa. It invests in the new Prosper Africa initiative, which aims to double two-way U.S.-Africa trade and investment by facilitating transactions and fostering fair and accessible business climates. The request counters terrorism in the Sahel and East Africa and reduces violent conflict, particularly in Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Somalia. Our focus is on enabling African countries to move from relying on grant-based foreign assistance or predatory lending to developing sustainable financial independence. Our engagement ensures better-targeted assistance with the most impact in the era of great power competition.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#2)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The Administration's FY 2020 budget request would provide \$4.9 billion in State Department- and USAID-administered bilateral assistance specifically for Africa, an 11% reduction from the FY 2019 request and 31% decrease compared to actual allocations in FY 2018 (excluding Food for Peace aid, which the Administration proposes to end entirely). The Administration has pledged to review all U.S. aid to Africa in order to target assistance toward "key countries and particular strategic objectives" and states with democratic, accountable governments. **What is the current status of this aid review?**

Answer:

As a part of the new Africa Strategy, the Administration is focused on enabling African countries to move from relying on grant-based foreign assistance or predatory lending to developing sustainable financial independence. The State Department and USAID are constantly reviewing our assistance to ensure it is effective and aligned with U.S. foreign policy objectives. This budget addresses foreign policy Administration priorities and reflects a continued effort to ensure U.S. foreign assistance is an efficient, effective, and fiscally responsible investment on behalf of the American people.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#3)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The Administration's FY 2020 budget request would provide \$4.9 billion in State Department- and USAID-administered bilateral assistance specifically for Africa, an 11% reduction from the FY 2019 request and 31% decrease compared to actual allocations in FY 2018 (excluding Food for Peace aid, which the Administration proposes to end entirely). **How is the Administration's commitment to focus aid resources on African countries that "encourage accountable and transparent governance" reflected in the proposal to significantly cut aid to Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa?**

Answer:

Africa remains a priority for the Administration. The FY 2020 request includes funding to promote peace and security on the continent, create an enabling environment for U.S. businesses, advance food security and economic growth, bolster governance programs, and address HIV/AIDS and other communicable illnesses. Active partnerships with the countries and people of Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa continue, and focus on supporting their aspirations for inclusive democracy, peace, and prosperity. The request seeks to foster stability throughout sub-Saharan Africa and translate it into enhanced national security and prosperity for Africans and for the American people.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#4)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What are the implications of this recent crackdown for efforts to normalize relations? How is the Administration weighing these actions as it assesses Sudan's progress on "Phase II" of the bilateral reengagement framework?

Answer:

The Government of Sudan's heavy-handed response to the ongoing protests has disrupted progress on this track. The deteriorating human rights situation, which includes a state of emergency declared in late February, threatens to undermine our entire Phase II engagement. We have urged the Government of Sudan to exercise restraint and respect the protesters' fundamental freedoms. We remain seriously concerned about, and will continue to monitor, Sudan's progress in a range of areas, including improving its human rights record and respecting freedoms of expression such as freedom of the press, religion or belief, peaceful assembly, and association.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#5)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Are there any actions that the Administration would consider to be “red lines” for Sudan re-engagement, removal from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list, and/or debt relief?

Answer:

The United States made clear that any progress in the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship is dependent on Sudan first making progress in a range of areas, including improving its human rights record and respecting freedoms of expression such as freedom of the press, religion or belief, peaceful assembly, and association.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#6)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

And how far does the Administration expect normalization to proceed when Bashir, who has been indicted by the ICC for genocide and crimes against humanity, appears set to remain in office beyond the constitutional limit of his time in office?

Answer:

In our public and private messages, we underscored that all constitutional amendments or other actions that would enable President Bashir to extend his time in office in contravention of the Sudanese constitution would be problematic. We made clear to the Sudanese that progress in the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship is dependent on Sudan making progress in a range of areas, including improving its human rights record and respecting freedoms of expression such as freedom of the press, religion or belief, peaceful assembly, and association. The United States is concerned about the political crisis in Sudan and has condemned the Bashir government's repressive actions against peaceful protestors.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#7)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

With Ethiopia scheduled to hold critical elections in 2020 and significant opportunities to support the country's new democratic opening to ensure credible polls, **why does the Administration's FY 2020 budget request propose a sizable cut to the accounts that would support democracy and governance programs?**

Answer:

We strongly support the important reforms underway in Ethiopia and that has not changed. Our broader budget request considers factors beyond individual country support, including the burden on U.S. taxpayers and whether partner countries are stepping up to use their own resources to their best effect. Our obligation is to produce exceptional results on behalf of the American people, and as we take a fresh look at matching resources to outcomes, I remain confident the State Department will have the resources to pursue our policy objectives in Ethiopia.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#8)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

While the security situation in Somalia remains concerning, the political and economic spheres look relatively more promising, despite continued tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States. **What is the United States doing to promote greater political stability and improve relations between federal and state authorities ahead of planned elections next year?**

Answer:

Somalia's long-term stability depends heavily on the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States reaching agreement on an appropriate delineation of authorities at the national and regional levels. The United States engages regularly with all political leadership to encourage Somali-led political, security, and economic reform efforts to support the country's stability, to include: a one-person-one-vote national electoral process in 2020; completion of the constitutional review process; implementation of the agreed national security architecture and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) transition plan; and fiscal reforms that will enable debt relief and resumption of international financial institution lending.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#9)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What more can the United States do to stabilize the Sahel region and promote development and economic opportunity for its people?

Answer:

We support the countries in the Sahel through broad-based programs that run the gamut from security and economic growth to human rights and countering violent extremism. Our embassies engage in a whole-of-government approach to ensure that U.S. assistance programs, diplomatic outreach, and security sector activities reinforce one another. Gains across these areas, and greater efficiencies in our programming, will help communities be less vulnerable, promote development and economic opportunity, and help strengthen stability and security in the Sahel.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#10)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Six years after France's military intervention and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, the security situation in Mali continues to deteriorate, while Burkina Faso has been subsumed by a growing Islamist insurgency. The Administration has pledged to help build the military capacity of the G5 Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) to counter cross-border threats, but a promised G5 Sahel "joint force" remains notional (at best) and these countries are not likely to be able to make significant headway in the near future. Meanwhile we have seen repeated credible allegations of serious human rights abuses on the part of military forces in Mali and Burkina Faso and by the ethnic militias they have backed as proxy forces. The Administration's budget proposal would cut bilateral development and health aid for Mali, and although it would add a small amount of bilateral development aid for Burkina Faso, health assistance for that country would decrease. **What is the Administration doing to impress upon our partners in the Sahel that progress against insurgent and terrorist groups is unlikely in the absence of governance improvements and respect for human rights?**

Answer:

I am committed to supporting African-led efforts to defeat terrorism and improve security. Senior Department officials have emphasized to African counterparts that military, intelligence, and law enforcement tools must reinforce – not replace – efforts to strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights and accountability, and stimulate broad-based economic opportunity. The United States emphasizes security force professionalism and accountability from the beginning of assistance programs and continues to urge the Government of Mali to conduct transparent investigations into accusations of human rights violations against Malian armed forces and to prosecute those found responsible for any such violations.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#11)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What can be done to support Burkina Faso's fragile democratic transition, which will cease to be a beacon of hope for the continent if it continues to be associated with a massive surge in insecurity?

Answer:

Our key objectives are to assist Burkinabes in strengthening their stability and governance, working with Burkinabes to counter regional threats, assisting Burkinabes with identifying and broadening economic development opportunities, and encouraging community participation in civic life. The U.S. is already encouraging Burkina Faso to pave the way for a credible, transparent, and democratic process to take place in the 2020 elections, even in the face of significant security challenges. Respect for human rights, the rule of law, the law of armed conflict, a strong criminal justice sector, and civilian authority are cornerstones of U.S. military and law enforcement training programs in Burkina Faso.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#12)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Six years after France's military intervention and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, the security situation in Mali continues to deteriorate, while Burkina Faso has been subsumed by a growing Islamist insurgency. The Administration has pledged to help build the military capacity of the G5 Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) to counter cross-border threats, but a promised G5 Sahel "joint force" remains notional (at best) and these countries are not likely to be able to make significant headway in the near future. Meanwhile we have seen repeated credible allegations of serious human rights abuses on the part of military forces in Mali and Burkina Faso, and by the ethnic militias they have backed as proxy forces. The Administration's budget proposal would cut bilateral development and health aid for Mali, and although it would add a small amount of bilateral development aid for Burkina Faso, health assistance for that country would decrease. **What safeguards are in place to ensure that U.S.-origin equipment provided to the G5 Sahel countries does not end up in the hands of abusive militia groups?**

Answer:

Defense articles and services provided by the Department on a grant basis are subject to statutorily required end-use monitoring and restrictions on retransfer, end-use, and security.

These requirements are set out in binding international agreements with all G5 Sahel countries, consistent with section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA). We also proactively monitor our assistance, emphasize the importance of our agreements, and address any concerns regarding reports of misuse of U.S.-origin equipment. Moreover, recipient units are vetted to ensure that assistance is provided only to units where there is no credible information that the unit committed a gross violation of human rights (pursuant to section 620M of the FAA).

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#13)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Several U.S. counterterrorism partner states in Africa, such as Uganda, Mauritania, and Chad, have questionable democratic credentials, and the security forces of these countries have periodically been implicated in human rights violations. **Beyond security assistance, what is the United States doing to promote political stability in Chad, which ranks among the world's most fragile states and has one of Africa's longest ruling leaders?**

Answer:

Through the Africa Regional Democracy Fund (ARDF), the Bureau of African Affairs provides foreign assistance resources to support programming that strengthens democratic institutions. ARDF programming in Chad includes the promotion of good governance, anti-corruption, and improvement of gender equality within the National Assembly. These programs will contribute to systems that promote and protect women's rights in Chad. Other ARDF program activities focus on promoting participation and accountability for elections by increasing civic awareness.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#14)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How would the FY2020 budget request support greater stability and security in CAR? In what ways would it respond to or counter growing Russian influence in the country?

Answer:

The UN peacekeeping mission in CAR (MINUSCA), supported by the United States, remains indispensable in advancing peace. U.S. assistance will continue to focus on improving the security environment and helping the government of CAR project state presence by providing training, equipment, and capacity building support to the CAR military. The Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement continues efforts to rebuild and professionalize CAR's judiciary and internal security forces as an important step to bring stability and end impunity. U.S. assistance to CAR security services helps serve as a counterweight to the transactional, less transparent security assistance from Russia.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#15)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How is the Administration working to address impunity for past abuses, which has impeded the return of conflict-displaced populations and has been a driving factor in ongoing violence?

Answer:

The U.S. continues to use every opportunity to press the government of CAR to hold human rights violators accountable. President Touadera plans to travel to Washington on April 7-12, and I intend to stress that the United States will remain a partner to the CAR government as it advocates against impunity. We will continue to impose domestic and international sanctions against war criminals and those responsible for human rights violations in CAR. Further, the United States continues to provide assistance to professionalize and expand the capabilities of the CAR Special Criminal Court as it works to ensure that victims of this conflict receive the justice they deserve.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#16)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What support can or should the United States provide to the next election process in CAR, due in 2020?

Answer:

In 2016, the Central African Republic saw an unprecedented peaceful transition of power with the election of President Faustin Touadera. Although the Touadera administration has faced significant challenges, the United States has remained a stalwart supporter and partner of the democratically-elected CAR government. During the 2016 election, MINUSCA played a key role in facilitating the elections. This directive was added to the MINUSCA mandate in advance of the elections, and we expect it will again be discussed during the next mandate renewal in November 2019. The United States will work with our partners in the UN Security Council to ensure that MINUSCA can again play a positive role in the 2020 elections.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#17)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Ahead of elections in 2020, Burundi has yet to resolve the political crisis that has prompted hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes since 2015 due to ongoing politically targeted violence and humanitarian hardship. Regionally mediated political talks have stalled amid growing tensions within the East African Community (including between Burundi and Rwanda, and between Rwanda and Uganda). The Administration's budget proposal would decrease bilateral health and development aid for Burundi, which is also designated as Tier III under the TVPA. **In what ways is the Administration working with regional actors to restart the EAC-convened political talks for Burundi, and to encourage greater political space ahead of elections?**

Answer:

The Department has urged the Government of Burundi at senior levels to expand political space, including ending restrictions on media outlets, and to respect the rights of freedom of assembly and association of opposition political actors. The United States has also urged the Government of Burundi and the EAC to renew their commitments to the EAC-led inter-Burundi Dialogue, including in February 19 remarks at the UN Security Council. We will continue to encourage the EAC and its member states to restart the Dialogue.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#18)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Ahead of elections in 2020, Burundi has yet to resolve the political crisis that has prompted hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes since 2015 due to ongoing politically targeted violence and humanitarian hardship. Regionally mediated political talks have stalled amid growing tensions within the East African Community (including between Burundi and Rwanda, and between Rwanda and Uganda). The Administration's budget proposal would decrease bilateral health and development aid for Burundi, which is also designated as Tier III under the TVPA. **What is the likely impact of the withdrawal in early 2019 of 1,000 Burundian soldiers from AMISOM (at the African Union's behest) on conditions within Burundi, if any? What has been the impact of Burundi's Tier III TVPA designation on U.S. support for Burundi's remaining ~4,000 soldiers serving in AMISOM?**

Answer:

The withdrawal of the 1,000 Burundian AMISOM soldiers is ongoing as of March 27. It is too early for the Department to assess what the impact will be on conditions within Burundi, though we continue to monitor the situation. The foreign assistance restriction under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act has affected U.S. support for Burundi's remaining soldiers in AMISOM, such as support for logistical flights from Burundi to Somalia and a mentoring program in Somalia. The Department has urged the Government of Burundi to take greater efforts to combat trafficking in persons so that we may better support Burundi's participation in AMISOM.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#19)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

For Djibouti, the FY 2020 request includes more funding for security assistance – including \$5 million, the only country-specific request for sub-Saharan Africa, in Foreign Military Financing – than for health, economic, and development assistance combined. That security assistance would be in addition to much larger security cooperation investments made by DOD. **Does Djibouti have the ability to absorb such sizable investments in its forces, and do both the State Department and USAID view investing more in security than in people and development to be the most effective way to promote US interests and foreign policy priorities in the country?**

Answer:

Djibouti is an important security partner for the United States, hosting our only enduring military presence in Africa since 2004. Cooperation with the Djiboutian armed forces is an important component of our partnership, and I believe Djibouti has the capacity to absorb the Foreign Military Financing in a way that will further our shared security interests in the region.

We remain committed to a holistic approach to our partnership with the people and Government of Djibouti. The United States has significant investments in the people of Djibouti beyond security matters, including ongoing workforce development programming preparing Djiboutian youth for key occupations in a skills-based service economy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#20)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

You said at the hearing that you are not prepared to provide an answer on whether the crimes committed against the Rohingya community constitute at least crimes against humanity, but you are looking at it more specifically. You also said that your objective is to change behavior as well as hold those responsible accountable. On November 15, 2017, then-Secretary of State Tillerson said in a joint press availability with Aung San Suu Kyi that these crimes had many of the “characteristics of crimes against humanity.” **Does the Department still stand by this statement today?**

Answer:

The United States has been the largest single donor to address the humanitarian crisis stemming from northern Rakhine State; our humanitarian assistance has exceeded \$494 million. The State Department supported a large-scale documentation project in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, to establish a comprehensive understanding of the human rights abuses committed in Rakhine State, Burma. The report made clear the extent and severity of the abuses that were committed, and the underlying information and findings assist in informing the decisions that my team and I make as the U.S. government continues to seek to advance accountability in Burma.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#21)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

You said at the hearing that you are not prepared to provide an answer on whether the crimes committed against the Rohingya community constitute at least crimes against humanity, but you are looking at it more specifically. You also said that your objective is to change behavior as well as hold those responsible accountable. **Given the abundant evidence documented by the United Nations and State Department staff, and the Holocaust Museum's remarks that the Burmese military had committed genocide against the Rohingya, why are you not yet prepared to make those same designations? When can Congress expect the Department to make the designation?**

Answer:

I am deeply concerned about the Burmese military's extensive, horrific human rights violations and abuses against the Rohingya. To establish a comprehensive understanding of the human rights abuses committed in Rakhine State, the Department supported a large-scale documentation project in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. The report clarified the extent and severity of the abuses, and the underlying information and findings will help inform our decisions as we seek accountability in Burma. Determinations that certain acts may amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing are not made in all cases in which such acts may have been committed; they depend on our assessment of the facts and consequences of such determinations in each context.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#22)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

You said at the hearing that you are not prepared to provide an answer on whether the crimes committed against the Rohingya community constitute at least crimes against humanity, but you are looking at it more specifically. You also said that your objective is to change behavior as well as hold those responsible accountable. **Beyond sanctioning a few individuals and military units, what steps has the administration taken to change Burmese behavior? Why has the United States sanctioned fewer individuals than other partners, such as the European Union? Why has the administration failed to sanction the commander-in-chief of the Burmese military, and other top military leaders?**

Answer:

The United States was the first country to sanction a Burmese officer after the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya, and has since sanctioned a total of five Burmese commanders and two military units for human rights abuses in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan States. The United States is the largest donor to the Rakhine State crisis, providing \$449 million in humanitarian assistance since August 2017. The U.S. helped create the UN Fact-Finding Mission and its successor, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar; supported the mandates of the UN Special Envoy and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation; and co-sponsored the UN General Assembly resolution on human rights in Burma in 2018.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#23)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

You said at the hearing that you are not prepared to provide an answer on whether the crimes committed against the Rohingya community constitute at least crimes against humanity, but you are looking at it more specifically. You also said that your objective is to change behavior as well as hold those responsible accountable. The Burmese military, acting with impunity, are now committing similar abuses against the largely Christian Chin and Kachin ethnic groups. **How will the Department hold them accountable?**

Answer:

In August 2018, the United States sanctioned Burmese Major General Khin Hlaing and the 99th Light Infantry Division for their roles in human rights abuses against minorities in Kachin and Shan States. We have supported the UN Fact-Finding Mission and its successor, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, which have mandates to investigate human rights violations throughout Burma. The United States also again designated Burma as a Country of Particular Concern for religious discrimination. We will continue to consider additional actions and will continue to call for accountability for Burmese security forces and others responsible for human rights violations and abuses and for the establishment of civilian control of the military.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#24)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

You said at the hearing that you are not prepared to provide an answer on whether the crimes committed against the Rohingya community constitute at least crimes against humanity, but you are looking at it more specifically. You also said that your objective is to change behavior as well as hold those responsible accountable. **Would you support re-establishing U.S. sanctions against Burmese military-owned business conglomerates such as MEC and MEHL? If not, why?**

Answer:

Accountability for human rights violations and abuses is a key priority for the United States in our policy towards Burma. We will continue to consider options for pursuing accountability and will implement those most likely to have an impact in changing the military's behavior, including targeted sanctions where appropriate.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#25)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Over one million Uighurs and Muslim ethnic minorities have been detained without due process under the guise of “anti-terrorism” efforts and Congress has repeatedly demonstrated bicameral, bipartisan support for condemning these abuses. **What has the Department done to ensure that U.S. technology transfers to Chinese entities have not contributed to China’s repression?**

Answer:

We are outraged by the Chinese Communist Party’s campaign of repression and mass detention of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in China.

In the wake of China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the Department of State is actively working with other agencies on effective actions to address the challenge. The Department has conducted outreach to U.S. and Chinese companies with business in Xinjiang to urge them to implement human rights safeguards in an effort to ensure their commercial activities do not contribute to these abuses.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#26)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Over one million Uighurs and Muslim ethnic minorities have been detained without due process under the guise of “anti-terrorism” efforts and Congress has repeatedly demonstrated bicameral, bipartisan support for condemning these abuses. You said in your testimony that you and other Department officials raise this issue with your Chinese counterparts each time you interact.

What has been their response? What is the administration’s strategy for holding Beijing accountable for these abuses?

Answer:

In meetings with Chinese counterparts, senior Department of State officials repeatedly speak out against Beijing’s highly repressive campaign against Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China. On March 13, we co-hosted an event with partners on the sidelines of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva to highlight the magnitude of the crisis. On March 26 in Washington, I met with affected Uighurs and pledged U.S. support.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#27)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Given that the State Department's March 25, 2019, report on the implementation of the RATA concludes the Chinese government violated the principle of reciprocity by systematically impeding travel to Tibet by U.S. diplomats, officials, journalists, and tourists in 2018, **have you begun identifying and denying visas to the Chinese officials responsible for implementing these restrictive policies, pursuant to the RATA of 2018?**

Answer:

We are committed to implementing RATA in the timeframe prescribed by Congress, including identifying those officials who are substantially involved in the formulation or execution of policies related to restricting access to Tibet for visa denials or revocations. We are currently determining the framework that will most effectively press Chinese authorities for reciprocity. We are committed to working closely with Congress in pursuit of our shared goal of seeing Americans have full access to China, including the Tibetan Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#28)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

March 10, 2019, marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule and the Dalai Lama's exile. The Chinese government has barred foreigners from traveling to Tibet until April 1 given the politically sensitive anniversary and remains assertive on the Chinese Communist Party's role in suppressing "separatists" plots in Tibet and deciding who will succeed the Dalai Lama. In December 2018, President Trump signed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA, PL 115-330) into law. **When will the Department appoint the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues role – a legislatively-mandated position?**

Answer:

In accordance with the Tibetan Policy Act, the Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues continues to coordinate U.S. government programs to preserve Tibet's distinct religious, linguistic, and cultural identity as well as efforts to promote dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama. We are in the process of selecting a Special Coordinator and hope to make the announcement soon.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#29)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

March 10, 2019, marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule and the Dalai Lama's exile. The Chinese government has barred foreigners from traveling to Tibet until April 1 given the politically sensitive anniversary and remains assertive on the Chinese Communist Party's role in suppressing "separatists" plots in Tibet and deciding who will succeed the Dalai Lama. In December 2018, President Trump signed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA, PL 115-330) into law. **Without the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, in what way and at what level is the Department engaging with Chinese authorities on the issue of Tibet? Have you engaged with your counterparts on these issues, as you had pledged to do in your written response to a question during your April 2018 confirmation hearing? If so, what has been the response from Chinese authorities?**

Answer:

U.S. government officials, including myself, the Vice President, our Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu continue to call upon the Government of China to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Tibetans and to provide U.S. officials, journalists, and tourists access to the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas. The Government of China continues to characterize the Dalai Lama as a separatist and accuses the United States and other governments of interfering in China's domestic affairs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#30)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

March 10, 2019, marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule and the Dalai Lama's exile. The Chinese government has barred foreigners from traveling to Tibet until April 1 given the politically sensitive anniversary and remains assertive on the Chinese Communist Party's role in suppressing "separatists" plots in Tibet and deciding who will succeed the Dalai Lama. In December 2018, President Trump signed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA, PL 115-330) into law. **What has the Department been doing to engage with China on the issue of succession, since the Chinese government continues to publicly assert its right to select the next Dalai Lama (as they did most recently on March 20, 2019)?**

Answer:

The United States remains concerned about Chinese government leaders' interfering in the selection, education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders. U.S. officials at multiple levels have underscored with their Chinese counterparts that decisions regarding the selection of Tibetan Buddhist leaders rests with the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhist leaders, and the Tibetan people.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#31)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

March 10, 2019, marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule and the Dalai Lama's exile. The Chinese government has barred foreigners from traveling to Tibet until April 1 given the politically sensitive anniversary and remains assertive on the Chinese Communist Party's role in suppressing "separatists" plots in Tibet and deciding who will succeed the Dalai Lama. In December 2018, President Trump signed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA, PL 115-330) into law. **Are you reaching out to like-minded governments to challenge China's blatant violation of the principle of religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists, and if so, what have you done specifically?**

Answer:

Promoting religious freedom is a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. We coordinate closely with like-minded governments and other partners on a variety of issues, including religious freedom and other human rights challenges. We monitor religious persecution and discrimination worldwide, including in China. We are concerned that, over the past decade, more than 150 Tibetan Buddhist monks have self-immolated in protest of China's repression of their beliefs and culture. We continue to raise the issue of religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists, including the right of choosing their own leaders without interference, in our bilateral engagements with the Chinese.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#32)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

March 10, 2019, marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule and the Dalai Lama's exile. The Chinese government has barred foreigners from traveling to Tibet until April 1 given the politically sensitive anniversary and remains assertive on the Chinese Communist Party's role in suppressing "separatists" plots in Tibet and deciding who will succeed the Dalai Lama. In December 2018, President Trump signed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA, PL 115-330) into law. **Why has President Trump not yet publicly called upon President Xi to negotiate with the Dalai Lama or his representative to find a lasting solution, as all U.S. presidents have done since 1997?**

Answer:

U.S. government officials, including myself, the Vice President, the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu continue efforts to establish conditions for a direct and meaningful dialogue between Chinese authorities and the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, that will lead to a sustainable settlement.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#33)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

March 10, 2019, marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule and the Dalai Lama's exile. The Chinese government has barred foreigners from traveling to Tibet until April 1 given the politically sensitive anniversary and remains assertive on the Chinese Communist Party's role in suppressing "separatists" plots in Tibet and deciding who will succeed the Dalai Lama. In December 2018, President Trump signed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (RATA, PL 115-330) into law. **Will you commit to pressing the Chinese authorities to allow for the opening of a U.S. consulate in Lhasa and not to allow the opening of any more Chinese Consulates in the U.S. until such U.S. Consulate is opened?**

Answer:

I will press the Chinese government to allow the opening of a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa, consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act. I will also fully implement the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act, and I will press Chinese authorities to reciprocate the access that China enjoys in the United States. I am committed to working closely with Congress in pursuit of our shared goal of seeing Americans have full access to China, including the Tibetan Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#34)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How is the Department engaging with third countries regarding Chinese investments, particularly when there are strategic risks or predatory Chinese lending terms at issue? What has been the general response? Do the countries share U.S. concerns about how Chinese investments may undermine their economic or national security interest?

Answer:

The Department is working with borrower countries to highlight the strategic risks associated with the predatory lending practices of countries such as China. U.S. engagement is showing results as we have started to see a number of would-be borrower nations scrutinize or reevaluate Chinese lending.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#35)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How have you ensured that we can identify these problematic investments and provide alternatives?

Answer:

As part of a broad, interagency effort, our embassies and officers in the field are speaking to third countries to assess the most problematic Chinese projects. The U.S. private sector is key to providing quality alternatives to Chinese engagement. We are working with U.S. companies to assist them to compete for projects in third countries where it makes sense to do so.

Through the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, we will mobilize newly expanded resources including a more-than-doubled exposure limit and the capacity to engage earlier in the project lifecycle. This new tool will help catalyze private-sector investment in developing economies.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#36)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What specific steps has the Department taken to ensure that there are Western competitors everywhere where China is putting forth projects? How does the administration plan to resource these initiatives, given the decreased budget request for the region from the FY18 enacted amount?

Answer:

We are not seeking to match every Chinese-affiliated project. Some projects the Chinese pursue are poorly targeted to the country's needs or simply not viable. Instead, we are providing capacity-building support to enable countries to make fully informed decisions. We are working on transparent, effective procurement processes that help countries assess life-cycle costs of infrastructure and allow our firms and those of likeminded countries to compete in all markets where China is active. These initiatives have been funded through targeted re-allocations from other elements of the budget. Our programs seek to leverage private-sector resources rather than match, dollar-for-dollar, public expenditures by other governments.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#37)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How is the Department engaging with partners and allies regarding adoption of Chinese 5G technology? More broadly, how do U.S. partners – from Europe to Asia – view the geopolitical competition between the United States and China? Is there a concern that by making nations “choose,” we may end up having some of them make choices that are not in the U.S. interest?

Answer:

Information technology networks and services are a critical element of our national security and economic prosperity. These networks are an attractive target for foreign adversaries, and we are actively working with our partners and allies to reduce the risk of unauthorized access and malicious cyber activity as we implement 5G networks.

Ultimately, countries have the sovereign right to decide how to build their critical infrastructure. As we are sharing our concerns about the risks of vendors subject to extrajudicial control by foreign powers, we are seeing numerous countries strengthen their 5G security requirements and regulations in response.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#38)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

When you recently met with President Duterte in Manila, did you raise concerns over extra-judicial killings and the politically motivated charges against his political opponents, including Senator de Lima and Maria Ressa of the online media publication, Rappler? What is the State Department doing to mitigate the risk that constitutional changes being debated in the Philippines do not result in further entrenchment of political dynasties, including that of President Duterte himself?

Answer:

The United States has consistently engaged the Philippine government on human rights issues at the highest levels over the past three years, as we did during my March visit to Manila. On March 29, we publicly voiced our concern with Maria Ressa's arrest. U.S. Embassy Manila officials are in regular contact with Senator de Lima's staff. The United States has supported the capacity building of Philippine institutions, including through U.S. judicial sector training aimed to strengthen the rule of law, due process, and respect for human rights. We will continue to emphasize these values in our future engagements.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#39)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

It appears to many that the administration has failed to meaningfully respond to democratic backsliding in the Indo-Pacific region out of fear that these countries will turn toward China. **Do you believe that promoting U.S. values of democracy, human rights, and good governance is an obstacle to advancing our other interests that risks countries “choosing” China over the United States?**

Answer:

I believe promoting values of democracy, human rights, and good governance advances U.S. interests. These values make for more responsive and just governments; more dynamic and open economies; and more willing and capable partners. Promoting these values is a key U.S. objective, as Vice President Pence laid out when he announced the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative. I will continue to work to build stronger, more vibrant, and more resilient partners who work with the United States to combat democratic and human rights backsliding.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#40)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Can you confirm that you will instruct your subordinates to reflect this position at any interagency meetings on the subject of military basing overseas? Will you commit to opposing any similar proposals to radically alter our current basing arrangements in Europe?

Answer:

I can assure you the United States is not asking our Allies to pay for our military presence at “cost-plus 50 percent.” However, we are asking our Allies to meet their commitment to invest in our collective defense and ensure fairer burden-sharing, which is a long-standing U.S. goal. The Department works closely with the Department of Defense on forward military presence issues, ensuring any changes are based on United States national security requirements.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#41)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

I am concerned about democratic backsliding in central Europe, particularly in Hungary and Poland, with growing corruption; shrinking press, academic, and religious freedom; and weakened judiciary independence. **Did you raise these concerns during your visit to the region in February? What steps are you taking to address this democratic backsliding?**

Answer:

I regularly speak with my Hungarian and Polish counterparts privately – and publicly when warranted – to promote shared Transatlantic principles, including the separation of powers, universal human rights, and fundamental freedoms. In the current era of heightened strategic competition, it is important to compete for positive influence in Central Europe. To that end, the State Department is working to bolster the democratic values that underpin the Western Alliance and remind people why the choices they made in 1989 are important today. We are working with civil society in the region to counter disinformation, strengthen the rule of law, fight corruption, counter Russian malign influence, and expand the space for independent voices.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#42)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What steps are you taking to combat Russian malign influence in the Balkans?

Answer:

The United States is actively working to counter Russian malign influence, in particular by pushing back on Russian efforts to exploit vulnerabilities and weaken democratic institutions. In the Western Balkans, we are partnering with the countries in the region as they work to develop strong, democratic, transparent institutions, combat corruption, increase media independence and reject disinformation, build engaged citizenries, and improve their energy security. Montenegro's NATO accession and the historic Prespa Agreement between North Macedonia and Greece demonstrate that sustained U.S. engagement and foreign assistance programs are helping the region move forward towards greater Western integration.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#43)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Is the Administration confronting Serbian leaders about their statements and actions cozying up to Moscow?

Answer:

We strongly support Serbia's Western integration and its stated, strategic goal of European Union membership. Serbia has said it seeks to balance this goal with its relationship with Russia but has also said it sees its future in Europe and the West. We also see Serbia's future in Europe and the West. Toward this end, we have urged Serbian leaders to undertake democratic reforms, especially strengthening rule of law and media freedom. These and other reforms are part of the EU accession process and ultimately will build Serbia's resilience against the malign influence campaigns carried out by actors like Russia.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#44)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Have we communicated to the EU and EU member states our belief that Serbia should not join the EU until it recognizes Kosovo?

Answer:

Normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, with mutual recognition at its core, is a top priority for the United States in the Western Balkans. We have communicated this clearly to our European partners. The EU has linked both countries under Chapter 35 of Serbia's accession negotiation process, calling for a legally binding agreement on comprehensive normalization of relations. The United States supports both Kosovo's and Serbia's advancement on their respective EU paths by meeting criteria laid down by the EU. We trust the EU will continue to support and assess each country's progress in implementing the necessary steps to achieve its integration aspirations.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#45)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Since your announcement in February giving Russia a six-month ultimatum to return to compliance with the INF Treaty, what steps have you taken to engage the Russians? What else are you doing to pressure the Russians in this six-month window?

Answer:

Since 2013, Russia has not taken any demonstrable steps to return to compliance and has fielded multiple battalions of its INF non-compliant missile. On February 2, the U.S. suspended its obligations under the Treaty, in response to Russia's material breach and provided Parties with formal notice that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty in six months.

Additionally, the United States is now moving forward with developing conventional ground-launched, INF-range missile capabilities. This work is designed to be reversible should Russia return to full and verified compliance. However, given Russia's February 2 announcement of its purported suspension of the Treaty and its stated interest in pursuing an additional ground-launched, INF-range system, Russia appears unlikely to do so.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#46)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Is Russia currently in compliance with the New START Treaty? Is the New START Treaty in U.S. national security interests?

Answer:

Both Russia and the United States are currently in compliance with the New START Treaty. The New START Treaty's numerical limits on Russia's strategic nuclear force; establishment of data exchanges including the locations, numbers, and technical characteristics of weapons systems and facilities; and its verification provisions contribute currently to U.S. national security. The Administration is currently reviewing whether to seek an extension of the Treaty, and central to that review is evaluating how the Treaty's expiration would impact U.S. national security, including Russia's ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms and serial noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China's continuing nuclear modernization.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#47)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The last round of U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Talks occurred in September 2017 and was chaired by then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Shannon. This is a forum that we should be using to ensure we avoid a nuclear conflict with Russia. **Why haven't you held another round of talks since then? Have you proposed to Russia that another round be held? Do you support holding additional rounds of these talks?**

Answer:

At their July 2018 meeting in Helsinki, President Trump and Russian President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. In August and October 2018, Ambassador Bolton and his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. State Department officials regularly meet with Russian officials bilaterally and multilaterally to discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#48)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

When will you impose the second round of sanctions on Russia for its chemical weapons attack on the Skripals as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (“the CBW Act”)? The CBW Act envisioned this second round of sanctions within three months of the initial determination that chemical weapons had been used. Why is it taking so long?

Answer:

We do not preview sanctions actions. However, we are working diligently with the interagency to prepare for imposing the second round of sanctions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#49)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Can you confirm whether President Trump has personally told President Erdogan that Turkey should not purchase the S-400 system?

Answer:

The Administration has been unequivocal in its opposition to Turkey's purchasing the S-400 system, and we have made clear that acquiring the S-400 will put at risk Turkey's continued role in the F-35 program – both aircraft acquisition and industrial participation – and expose it to sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). In February, Vice President Pence stated publicly that, "the U.S. would not stand idly by while NATO Allies purchase weapons from our adversaries," specifically pointing to Turkey. Turkey's purchase of a \$2.5 billion S-400 air defense missile system from Russia poses great danger to NATO and to the strength of the Alliance and could lead to consequences for Turkey.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#50)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How does the U.S. military withdrawal from parts of Syria affect our assistance and the very limited diplomatic presence we had in Syria?

Answer:

We are keeping a residual force in Syria while the deliberate and coordinated withdrawal of our troops continues. We remain engaged in Syria and our policy objectives remain the same: (1) the enduring defeat of ISIS; (2) an irreversible Syrian-led and -owned political settlement; and (3) removing all Iranian-commanded forces from the entirety of Syria. Likewise, we will continue to support international efforts to establish local security, local governance, and a restored economy and justice and accountability in liberated areas. We will also continue to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria and the region. Our staff continue to perform their assistance oversight responsibilities from their permanent posts.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#51)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The 2020 budget calls for zeroing out all economic assistance to Syria. Last year, Saudi Arabia and other countries backfilled funding on those U.S.-designed projects after the United States decided to withdraw its assistance to communities seeking to hold territory after the battle with ISIS. **Is there a similar plan to fund projects that help Syrians in post-ISIS communities recover? Which U.S.-designed projects are set to receive funds from foreign governments and which governments have pledged to fund these projects? What specific role does the U.S. have in shaping and monitoring these projects that are not paid for by U.S. foreign assistance?**

Answer:

The Department is continually re-evaluating stabilization assistance levels and programming, regardless of fiscal year. Our objective in these reviews is to ensure our assistance is targeted, effective, and set at the appropriate level. We continue to seek contributions from Coalition partners, per the President's request. Coalition donors fund a number of programs managed by the United States, including essential services, explosive remnants of war removal, education, civil society, first responders, livelihoods, and local governance. We monitor these programs according to our own procedures and per the specific agreements set with these countries.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#52)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The Committee has been informed that the Department has decided to make significant staffing cuts to Embassy Baghdad. **Please detail how many positions will be cut, from which agency functions, and what plans (if any) exist to fulfill the duties those positions fulfilled? Please also provide a comprehensive accounting of staffing at all other U.S. diplomatic posts in Iraq, including in Basrah and Erbil.**

Answer:

The State Department regularly assesses staffing abroad to ensure our resources are properly aligned with our objectives. Embassy Baghdad recently undertook a staffing review of 232 positions with the goal of pursuing U.S. objectives with as few people as possible given a high-threat environment. It was determined that 70 positions could be eliminated: 26 from State; 35 from Defense; three from Justice; and six from USAID. Duties will be integrated into existing positions, fulfilled through Temporary Duty, or managed from an alternative location. As of March 27, total Chief of Mission staffing in Iraq totals 1,035, including 42 at the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center and 315 in Erbil. Operations in Basrah are suspended, and local staff are transferring to Baghdad.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#53)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How does the United States plan to adjust its diplomatic and development priorities given the ongoing political transition in Algeria, following over 20 years of rule by President Bouteflika? What opportunities and challenges does this transition present?

Answer:

Algeria remains an important partner on regional security, counter terrorism, economic development, and trade and energy. The United States has a strong partnership with Algeria that will endure as we continue working together to tackle shared challenges and promote the security and prosperity of our citizens in the months and years ahead. Although I will continue to monitor political developments, only Algerians can determine how they navigate this transition.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#54)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What is the State Department doing to advance a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yemen between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis?

Answer:

The Administration supports UN Special Envoy (UNSE) for Yemen Martin Griffiths in his efforts to facilitate a political resolution. Since FY 2016, we have awarded grants to Yemeni organizations involved in local peacebuilding and post-conflict planning and provided the UNSE office \$6.2 million to support personnel and operations. We endorsed UNSCR 2452 creating the UN Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement, and we communicate often with Special Envoy Griffiths to discuss how we can support his efforts. U.S. diplomatic engagement in the Quad (United States, UK, UAE, and Saudi Arabia) has influenced Coalition maintenance of the Hudaydah ceasefire, providing space for building momentum toward broader reconciliation.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#55)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What leverage does the United States have over the various parties to the conflict to get them to commit to a peaceful solution to the conflict? How are we using that leverage?

Answer:

Our positive relationships with the Republic of Yemen government (ROYG) and the Coalition have been instrumental in the Administration's ability to push for resolution at critical junctures. Common interests in countering malign Iranian activity are a cornerstone of our leverage with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the sale of U.S. defense articles to these regional partners protects their borders from Iranian and Houthi threats. For example, this past year, we were able to prevent a UAE-led offensive on the city of Hudaydah and worked with the Saudis to pressure the ROYG to attend peace talks in Sweden.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#56)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The State Department recently transmitted to Congress the Congressionally mandated Yemen strategy, in which the Department stated that “there is no military solution to this conflict.”

Have you communicated this view to the Saudi-led coalition? If the UN-led peace process falls apart, would you support the Saudi-led coalition and local Yemeni forces taking the Port of Hudaydah by force?

Answer:

We have been clear that only a comprehensive political solution will bring the Yemen conflict to an end and resolve Yemen’s economic and humanitarian crisis. We communicate this regularly to the Coalition at the highest levels and will continue to do so.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#57)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

At a time when Yemeni people are trapped in conflict, why won't you consider lifting the travel ban on Yemenis?

Answer:

The Administration's primary responsibility is to ensure the safety and security of U.S. citizens and of the United States itself. The ROYG does not have full control over its territory – which is home to the Houthis and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – its passport issuance, or its airports. The Administration reviews its determinations under Presidential Proclamation 9645 every 180 days and takes into account progress made by the ROYG with regard to information-sharing and identity-management practices as part of this process.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#58)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

CNN recently reported that the UAE transferred U.S.-origin defense equipment to third parties in Yemen, including Yemenis who have ties to Al Qaeda. **Please provide the Committee with an update on the State Department-led investigation. What are the consequences for our defense relationship with the UAE if these transfers did take place?**

Answer:

We are investigating this matter and are coordinating with our partners to determine whether U.S.-origin weapons or other defense articles were transferred to unauthorized end-users in Yemen. We have not reached final determinations and continue to investigate. We will continue to update the Committee as additional information is available. If the articles were intentionally transferred without the Department's written consent, we will coordinate within the interagency to determine the appropriate next steps and inform the Committee of any repercussions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#59)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Last year, Congress required the Pentagon to certify that the Saudi and Emirati governments were working sincerely to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen and reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. Absent that certification, the United States would not be able to refuel Saudi and UAE jets operating over Yemen. Many of us believe the initial September certification was disingenuous, considering the coalition bombed a school bus just a month before. Since then, the Administration has stopped sending certifications, despite the fact that there is no legal authority to terminate these reports to Congress. **Are there plans to send a certification or a waiver to Congress? Are Saudi Arabia and the UAE making a good faith effort toward a diplomatic solution? Are they taking appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis by increasing access at the airport in Sana'a? Are they taking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from their military operations?**

Answer:

As of November 11, 2018, the United States ceased refueling support to the Coalition's counter-Houthi operations in Yemen. Because the United States has discontinued in-flight refueling that would be subject to the restriction in Section 1290, a subsequent certification under Section 1290(d) is not necessary. The Coalition has demonstrated active diplomatic support for the Special Envoy's efforts before, during, and since the Stockholm talks in December 2018. Sana'a Airport has remained open to humanitarian flights throughout the conflict. Additionally, the Coalition's civilian casualty mitigation efforts have resulted in demonstrated improvements in its targeting practices.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#60)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

There have been numerous media reports about armed UAVs operated by Houthis in Yemen penetrating the air space of our partners in the Gulf. **What specific steps have you taken to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities and American citizens in the Gulf from this UAV threat?**

Answer:

Iran takes advantage of the instability resulting from the Yemen conflict to increase its presence in the Arabian Peninsula and the region. The provision of Iranian weapons to the Houthis threatens U.S. citizens residing in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, international shipping in the Bab al-Mandab strait, and our allies and partners in the region. The Administration supports UN-led efforts to bring an end to the conflict, which will reduce the instability in Yemen that allows groups like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS, to thrive. The provision of limited support, including advice and intelligence, to the Coalition helps us to counter these common threats.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#61)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Just a few weeks after the heinous murder of Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi, you wrote that the Crown Prince has moved the country in a reformist direction. **What specific reforms is the Department working on with Saudi Arabia now?**

Answer:

The Department engages the Saudi leadership on a range of political, economic, and security issues that underpin the U.S.-Saudi relationship. *Vision 2030*, for example, provides an opportunity for the U.S. government to engage both leadership and the country's people in advancing an economically and culturally vibrant society. The current reform efforts underway seek to diversify the country's economy, advance a more progressive vision of the Kingdom's cultural space, and bring millions of young Saudis – both men and women – into the workforce. In engaging on these issues, Department officials routinely stress to the Saudis that political repression endangers the many positive reforms the Saudi government is pursuing.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#62)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Last year, Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership requested a determination within 120 days of any foreign person responsible for human rights violations tied to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi – which could result in sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act. Just over a month later, these Senators wrote again asking for a specific determination of the responsibility of the Crown Prince with respect to the murder. The deadline for these determinations has come and gone. **Why have you not submitted a report to Congress about whether the Crown Prince is responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi?**

Answer:

The Department shares your conviction that those responsible for this horrific act must be held accountable. The United States was the first country to take action to promote accountability, when on October 23 the Department placed visa restrictions on those suspected of involvement in the murder. On November 15, the Treasury and State Departments imposed financial sanctions on implicated Saudi officials under the Executive Order implementing the Global Magnitsky Act. The Department will continue to utilize these tools.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#63)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Why is there a discrepancy between the numbers of Saudis arrested by the Saudi government and the numbers of Saudis designated by Magnitsky sanctions?

Answer:

The Saudi Arabian Public Prosecutor's Office has indicted 11 individuals and continues to investigate others. The criminal trial of the 11 individuals is ongoing. The Department continues to monitor the trial, press Saudi authorities for full accountability of Mr. Khashoggi's killers, and urge transparency in its legal process. The Administration's own actions are based on an U.S.-developed fact set. The Administration has thus far utilized three different legal authorities to promote accountability – the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), Executive Order 13818 implementing and expanding upon the Global Magnitsky Act, and Section 7031(c) of the Appropriations Act. The Department will continue to utilize these tools.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#64)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Media reports indicated that the White House blocked CIA Director Haspel from briefing rank and file members of Congress on the Khashoggi matter. Cleared committee staff have also been blocked from accessing this information. According to the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for the “review and study on a continuing basis laws, programs, and Government activities relating” to “intelligence activities relating to foreign policy.” **Will you commit to adhering to proper Congressional oversight and not stand in the way of any intelligence briefing to this committee or to members of this committee about the murder of Jamal Khashoggi?**

Answer:

Yes, the Department is committed to keeping the Committee informed regarding its ongoing efforts to hold those responsible for Jamal Khashoggi’s murder accountable.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#65)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

At what level of Saudi government has the Department of State raised the case of the detention of dual U.S.-Saudi national Dr. Walid Fitaihi without charge or due process? What has the Saudi response been? What efforts have been undertaken to secure Dr. Fitaihi's release?

Answer:

We continue to raise Dr. Fitaihi's case at the highest levels of Saudi leadership, and I spoke to the Crown Prince on March 19. Embassy Riyadh and the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau leadership also continue to raise our concerns with Saudi counterparts in Washington and Riyadh. The Saudi Arabian government does not recognize dual citizenship but has granted regular consular access following sustained U.S. government engagement. The Department's highest priority is the safety and well-being of U.S. citizens abroad. We will continue to engage Saudi leadership to ensure Dr. Fitaihi's well-being until the situation is satisfactorily resolved.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#66)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The 2020 budget request calls for \$175 million in a global Diplomatic Progress Fund, which Deputy Secretary Sullivan described as a fund to effectively respond to new opportunities arising from diplomatic and peace progress and emerging counter-Iran needs.” **What will these funds be used for? How will these funds be used to counter Iran? Will these funds be used to advance the President’s Middle East Peace plan? If so, how do you intend to use these funds, specifically, for the purpose of advancing peace between Israelis and Palestinians within the constraints of the administration’s interpretation of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act, which has prevented any U.S. economic assistance from supporting the Palestinians? Do you support a revision of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act?**

Answer:

The Diplomatic Progress Fund will enable the United States to provide assistance when diplomatic breakthroughs present an opportunity to advance U.S. interests, including to counter Iranian influence or to support diplomatic efforts such as a plan for Middle East Peace. When the Administration presents its vision for a lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians, I welcome the opportunity to discuss with Congress what role U.S. assistance can and should play in achieving that goal. I also look forward to discussing with Congress the role of assistance in light of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA).

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#67)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2109**

Question:

Did the State Department tell the Afghan National Security Advisor that it would no longer participate in meetings with him? How does sidestepping the Afghan National Security Advisor, a close advisor of President Ashraf Ghani, advance U.S. policy in Afghanistan and support an inclusive reconciliation process?

Answer:

The State Department has communicated to Afghan National Security Advisor Mohib that U.S. officials will not meet with him in light of his sustained public campaign directly and falsely attacking United States policy in Afghanistan, as well as his unfounded and personalized accusations against the senior U.S. official implementing that policy, Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. U.S. officials have also communicated the same message to President Ghani. The United States—led by Ambassador John Bass—continues to work closely with President Ghani and his team on all issues related to Afghan security, including on advancing an inclusive reconciliation process.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#68)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Given the widespread understanding that the 2018 Bangladesh general elections were neither free nor fair, what elements of U.S. policy towards Bangladesh will change to reflect the deterioration of democracy in the Country?

Answer:

Following Bangladesh's December 30 election, the Department expressed concern in a January 1 statement about "credible reports of harassment, intimidation, and violence in the pre-election period" and "election-day irregularities [that] prevented some people from voting, which undermined faith in the electoral process." President Trump sent a letter to Prime Minister Hasina further raising our concern about the election. We continue to raise these concerns with Bangladesh senior officials, including the prime minister and foreign minister, and support calls for an independent investigation into the suppression of political opposition, their supporters, and journalists and other electoral-related complaints.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#69)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Then-U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh Marcia Bernicat's vehicle was attacked on August 4, 2018, when she was returning from a dinner party. Though she thankfully escaped unharmed, the incident prompts questions about the resources for U.S. diplomatic security. **Was the Regional Security Office in Dhaka fully staffed during the August 4 attack that targeted Ambassador Bernicat? What warnings, if any, did the Department of State have in advance of the attack? What concrete actions has the Department taken to understand how the attack occurred, who was responsible, or to bolster diplomatic security presence in Bangladesh since the attack?**

Answer:

In August 2018, the staffing pattern for the Regional Security Office at U.S. Embassy Dhaka included five Diplomatic Security (DS) Special Agents, including one Regional Security Officer (RSO), three Assistant RSOs, and one Assistant RSO-Investigator. At the time of the attack, Ambassador Bernicat's bodyguard program was fully staffed and two DS special agents were in-country (one agent was on leave and Post was awaiting two incoming agents). The Department was not aware of credible information indicating the attack would occur. After the attack, DS deployed a Mobile Security Deployment Training Team to conduct security training for Post staff. Post continues to work with the host government to investigate the attack.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#70)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

We are concerned that China continues to block the UN 1267 committee designation of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). **What effort is the U.S. making to ensure that China stops enabling terrorism in South Asia?**

Answer:

Our views on Masood Azhar and JEM, the U.S.- and UN-designated terrorist group he leads, are well known. Azhar clearly meets the criteria for designation by the UN Security Council 1267 Committee as the founder and leader of JEM, a group the United Nations first designated in 2001. We are working to ensure the designation list is updated and accurate. We have made it clear we will work with our allies and partners to use all available avenues, including, if necessary, a standalone UN Security Council Resolution, to ensure that the founder and leader of JEM is held accountable by the international community.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#71)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

I understand that India claims its February 26 strike inside settled Pakistan hit an active JEM terrorist training camp, and the State Department termed the strike a “counter terrorism” operation. **Does the Department believe that India engaging in military action inside settled Pakistan is an appropriate response to a terrorist attack by a group based in Pakistan (albeit conducted by an Indian national)? Was the Department concerned by the potential escalatory or legal ramifications of such a strike?**

Answer:

Following Indian counterterrorism actions on February 26, I spoke with Indian Minister of External Affairs Swaraj to emphasize our close security partnership and shared goal of maintaining peace and security in the region. I also spoke to Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi to underscore the priority of de-escalating current tensions by avoiding military action and the urgency of Pakistan’s taking meaningful action against terrorist groups operating on its soil. I expressed to both ministers that we encourage India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and avoid escalation. I also encouraged both ministers to prioritize direct communication and avoid further conflict.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#72)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Can you characterize the current tension in Pakistan over scarce water resources? How might this stress amplify tensions with India should India seek to restrict the flow of rivers whose headwaters it controls, as India threatened during the recent Indo-Pak crisis that flared up last month?

Answer:

Although transboundary issues are a significant hindrance for Pakistan's water sector, the greatest challenges are internal to Pakistan and are linked to mismanagement of water resources and population growth. The Indus River Basin, which is fed from glaciers originating in India, is the primary source of water for most of Pakistan – including 90% of agricultural land – and is supplemented by transboundary water from Afghanistan. Pakistan continues to express concerns about India's building dam projects, which predate the Pulwama attack, and argue the projects are not in line with the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT). However, Pakistan has stated it is not concerned about India's diversion of water as long as it adheres to the IWT.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#73)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How has the U.S. adjusted its assistance programming for Sri Lanka to reflect the impact that the breaking of democratic norms may have?

Answer:

At the time of constitutional crisis, the United States expressed concern publicly and privately that the crisis undermined the country's international reputation and economy. With likeminded states, we urged that parliament be reconvened and the rule of law be upheld. During the crisis, the Millennium Challenge Corporation declined to vote on approval of Sri Lanka's \$480 million compact, as was previously scheduled. Sri Lanka's democratic institutions, namely the judiciary and parliament, ultimately reinstated constitutional order, with senior Sri Lankan officials expressing appreciation for U.S. government efforts to ensure the crisis was resolved in accordance with the rule of law. As such, we are continuing appropriated assistance.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#74)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What impact does the Sri Lankan government's appointment of an individual accused of crimes against humanity to the position of Chief of Army staff have on our security assistance posture?

Answer:

I share your concerns about the appointment of Shavendra Silva. The Department takes all allegations of human rights seriously and raises its concerns with the Government of Sri Lanka when high-level appointments appear to conflict with Sri Lanka's commitments. As we have told the President of Sri Lanka, the appointment was not in line with Sri Lanka's commitment to accountability, justice, and reconciliation. We will continue to press Sri Lanka to fulfill its human rights commitments and obligations. We will also continue to enforce the Leahy Law and the restrictions it applies to U.S. security assistance.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#75)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How would you rate Sri Lanka's efforts to address longstanding issues of accountability as agreed to in the 2015 UN Human Rights council resolution adopted with support of the Sri Lankan government?

Answer:

We welcome Sri Lanka's co-sponsorship of UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/40/L.1 extending international monitoring of its commitments to reconciliation, justice, and accountability. Sri Lanka established an Office of Missing Persons in 2018. An Office of Reparations is also being established, with commissioners appointed. Sri Lanka's 2019 budget funded both offices. Over 80 percent of occupied lands have been returned. We support the government's efforts to repeal and replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act. We are encouraging the government to make progress on establishing a truth-seeking commission and judicial accountability mechanism, expected in 2020.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#76)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
May 27, 2019**

Question:

Given the Administration's priority on the Indo-Pacific region, and the National Security Strategy's focus on a global competition with China, will the administration be increasing the number of positions assigned to the Indo-Pacific region? If so, how many positions will be added? Will these be new positions or existing positions? If they are existing positions, from where will they be reassigned?

Answer:

I support the President's FY 2020 budget request and the position requests contained therein. The Department routinely reviews its staffing to ensure it is effectively advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and uses a variety of tools, including diplomatic density, to assess staffing levels. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs is also planning to reprogram three Public Diplomacy positions from Canberra, Seoul, and Beijing to Kolonia, Singapore, and Jakarta, respectively. The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs has reprogrammed six positions within the region to directly support the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#77)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Please describe the impact of the FBI's Transnational Anti-Gang Units (TAG) in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which are funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). How many gang members have been brought to justice as a result of the TAG's efforts? How many gang leaders have been extradited to the United States?

Answer:

The Department supports specialized and vetted units in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – including the Transnational Anti-Gang Units (TAG) – to combat transnational criminal organizations. In 2018, vetted and specialized units arrested more than 8,600 individuals in the Northern Triangle. Since mid-2017, coordinated regional operations led to the filing of nearly 4,000 criminal charges, including a Salvadoran MS-13 leader responsible for coordinating criminal activities in the United States. TAGs regularly share information with the FBI to support U.S. investigations. Since 2017, Northern Triangle governments have extradited more than 65 high-level criminals for prosecution in the United States.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#78)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Around the globe, LGBTQI people have been harassed, tortured and even killed, just for being who they are. **Why did the U.S. not join over 30 other nations in signing the joint statement delivered to the UN Human Rights Council on March 18, 2019, calling for a thorough investigation into the anti-LGBTI crimes being perpetrated in Chechnya? Who made the decision to not sign?**

Answer:

That statement was made during the 40th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, from which the United States withdrew in June 2018. Consistent with our withdrawal, the United States is not participating in any UN Human Rights Council sessions, including by signing onto or aligning with any resolutions or statements pertaining to those sessions. We continue to work to advance human rights at the UN and in regional fora, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, where we joined 16 countries in invoking the “Moscow Mechanism” against Russia for allegations of human rights violations and abuses in Chechnya, including against LGBTI persons. We continue to press Russia to bring those responsible to justice.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#79)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Around the globe, LGBTQI people have been harassed, tortured and even killed, just for being who they are. **Will you condemn the ongoing anti-LGBTI crimes happening in Chechnya and commit to helping LGBTI people in Chechnya, Egypt and other countries to ensure they are not targeted for abuse?**

Answer:

Under my leadership, the Department has been clear and consistent in affirming that human rights are universal and that no one should face violence, criminalization, or discrimination in areas such as employment, housing, and provision of government services because of their LGBTI status. We have and will continue to stand up and speak out in support of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of LGBTI persons in all corners of the globe, including in Chechnya and Egypt, and press to hold perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses to account.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#80)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Around the globe, LGBTQI people have been harassed, tortured and even killed, just for being who they are. **Do you pledge to continue to support State Department programming aimed at meeting emergency needs of human rights defenders?**

Answer:

Absolutely. The Department continues to provide strong U.S. programmatic and emergency support for LGBTI human rights defenders and civil society organizations working to counter violence, severe discrimination, and criminalization of LGBTI conduct and/or status.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#81)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Does the State Department believe that national leaders around the world have a duty to condemn hate speech or incitement? Does the Department believe its representatives, including at United Nations bodies, should advance this principle? Does the Department believe that fighting racism helps build diverse democratic societies, and is it U.S. policy to do so around the globe?

Answer:

State Department officials regularly speak out to condemn hate speech and encourage other governments to do the same. Unfortunately, we see many countries using restrictions on freedom of expression to target the political opposition or human rights defenders. We hold up our framework of civil rights laws and the infrastructure to ensure their implementation as a model for deterring and punishing those who discriminate or engage in violence based on race.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#82)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Given the many intensifying displacement crises around the world, why hasn't PRM used any Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) funds over the past two years? This account is fully funded at its \$100 million authorized level, which could be used to save lives and prevent further displacement. Are there new protocols or barriers to drawdown that may be impeding ERMA funds being spent?

Answer:

While there are more global humanitarian assistance needs now than there have been in decades, the Department has been able to address emergency needs through existing Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) resources and has not had to seek approval from the President to tap into ERMA funds. There are no new protocols or barriers to drawing down funds from ERMA.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#83)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

On January 29, 2018, new procedures were announced to process refugees from certain countries for resettlement, in addition to new data-collection and processing requirements put in place over the last two years. **Do these new systems, and the lengthened time it takes to process refugees, require additional resources beyond what was necessary under the previous procedures? Why did the Department of State request fewer funds in FY 2020 than it did in previous years for the U.S. refugee admissions program?**

Answer:

The screening and vetting protocols associated with the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) play a crucial role in preventing the admission of foreign nationals who may be involved in acts of terrorism or other threats to national security and public safety.

The budget request for the USRAP includes funding to support all overseas processing steps, data collection, transportation, and initial reception and placement services for 30,000 refugees and 10,000 Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs). The request reflects anticipated costs of the program based on current operating levels. The FY 2020 Admissions ceiling will be set after consultations between the Administration and Congress before the start of the fiscal year.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#84)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How will the administration's reported plan to close USCIS international operations impact refugee processing? Is the U.S. continuing to conduct overseas interviews for all priority streams of refugee applicants? If so, how many individuals are currently going through this process and how long will this process take? Has the State Department established any benchmarks or goals for case processing times?

Answer:

The Department already performs services on behalf of USCIS at more than 200 posts overseas and is committed to working with USCIS to ensure a smooth transition of services over the next year. The specific USCIS functions the Department will absorb will be determined in the months ahead. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program continues to conduct overseas interviews for all priority streams of refugees. Over 109,000 applicants now await initial interviews by Department-funded Resettlement Support Centers, and over 81,000 applicants await interviews by USCIS. The average case processing time from date of referral to departure to the United States (or closure if denied) is two years and five months.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#85)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What new security vetting is being implemented in the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program by the administration? Given the extensive scrutiny that refugees have previously faced, what benefits have such vetting changes added? How is the Administration ensuring that security screening of refugees before their entry to the United States is being done in a timely manner? How long are current wait times for security advisory opinion (SAO) requests and what has been the increase in case processing times under the new SAO procedures? Which agencies have typically processed SAO requests and which agencies are involved under the new SAO procedures?

Answer:

In January 2018, the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced additional security enhancements to strengthen the integrity of the USRAP. The process for screening refugees is managed by DHS and includes the involvement of the Intelligence Community, including the National Counterterrorism Center, as well as the Departments of State and Defense and the FBI. Only after an applicant has cleared all security screening will DHS consider granting admission to the United States. Refugee applicants undergo a number of different security checks at different stages in their processing, and the length of these checks can vary based on the unique traits of each individual applicant.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#86)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What is the State Department doing to address the concern that fewer individuals granted SIVs will contribute to fewer individuals willing to serve with the U.S. in the future, thus damaging our national security?

Answer:

We are committed to supporting those who have helped U.S. military and other government personnel perform their duties, often at great risk to themselves and their families.

We are aware of how much we owe our Afghan and Iraqi colleagues and of the risks they face.

In FY 2017, we issued visas to 4,120 principal applicants – more than any other year. In FY 2018, we issued approximately 1,645 visas to principal applicants. While we encountered longer processing times in FY 2018, we have identified the challenges and are working proactively to resolve them. The SIV process is a collaborative effort among our interagency partners and our focus is to facilitate visa issuance while protecting our national security.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#87)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Regarding the November 29, 2018, Presidential Memorandum on Trafficking in Persons, what was the process used to determine the number and scope of the waivers in the Presidential Memorandum?

Answer:

The Department and the Administration engaged with relevant agencies to conduct a detailed review of the programs that would be affected by any applicable restrictions for Tier 3 governments and the available justifications for potential waivers. Waivers on restricted assistance were granted only where the President determined waivers promoted the purposes of the TVPA or were otherwise in the U.S. national interest.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#88)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Regarding the November 29, 2018, Presidential Memorandum on Trafficking in Persons, what guidance was provided, particularly to USAID missions, regarding the implementation of the Presidential Memorandum?

Answer:

The Administration seeks to implement the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) foreign assistance restrictions in a way that holds governments accountable for failing to meet the minimum standards to eliminate trafficking in persons in accordance with the November 29, 2018, Presidential Memorandum. This has included providing guidance, as needed, to State Department and USAID bureaus and missions on the application of the TVPA restrictions as they relate to existing and planned programs. I have directed my leadership team to explore the use of available authorities in certain limited cases where it is in our foreign policy and national security interest to continue assistance that would otherwise be subject to the TVPA restrictions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#89)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Can you explain how the Department's interpretations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) provision on "avoidance of significant adverse effects" was included in the determinations of the waivers included in Presidential Memorandum and additional waivers?

Answer:

The authority to grant waivers of the assistance restriction under the TVPA is exercised by the President, consistent with applicable requirements. The restrictions will be applied in a way that is mindful of the impact on people who rely on life-saving services, particularly vulnerable populations in greatest need. The restriction applies only to assistance for the governments of countries listed as Tier 3 in the annual Trafficking in Persons report. United States assistance for the people of these countries provided through NGOs and civil society organizations is generally not subject to the restriction.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#90)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) definition of “nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance,” which is referred to in the TVPA, has been stated as the benchmark for excluding certain activities. The definition in TVPA (codified at 22 USC 7102(8)) sets out that the following, among other things, should be treated as humanitarian assistance: Economic Support Funds (ESF) authorized for use as Development Assistance (DA); disaster relief assistance, expressly including International Disaster Assistance (IDA) under FAA Sec. 491; “humanitarian and other development assistance in support of programs of nongovernmental organizations [under FAA Development Assistance authorities]; and a catch-all for “other programs involving . . . humanitarian assistance.” **What is the administration's definition of “humanitarian” in the context of the November presidential memorandum? What criteria were used to determine which activities were or were not excluded? What approach has the administration taken in using its discretion under the catch-all authority? What steps has it taken to avoid arbitrary and capricious application of this discretion?**

Answer:

I have directed my leadership team to take a common-sense and consistent approach to implementing the restrictions under the TVPA in accordance with the Presidential Memorandum. The restrictions will be applied in a way that is mindful of the impact on people to whom we provide these life-saving services, particularly vulnerable populations in greatest need. As part of implementing the restrictions under the TVPA, certain limited activities, such as life-saving health programs and other programs benefitting conflict-displaced and refugee populations will continue under available authorities.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#91)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Additionally, under the definition in Sec. 110 (d) (1) (A) of the TVPA of 2000, is the term “provided” interpreted to mean the obligation of funding, and/or disbursement of previously obligated funds? If the latter, how much funding does the Administration estimate is no longer eligible to be provided to these countries, and what are the plans for its notification and reprogramming?

Answer:

The TVPA restrictions under the November 29, 2018, Presidential Memorandum apply to the new obligation of certain types of foreign assistance during FY 2019 for the governments of countries listed as Tier 3 in the Department’s 2018 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, regardless of the fiscal year of the funds. The State Department and USAID are still considering plans for potential reprogramming of funds, and I look forward to providing you more information as additional decisions are made.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#92)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Please explain how dual-key authorities such as DOD Section 333 (global train and equip) are being handled in the context of the presidential memorandum. For example, DOD notified its intent to provide \$7.2 million in CT assistance to Mauritania's military in FY2018; since this notification was sent up in the previous fiscal year, is the Sec. 333 package to Mauritania unaffected by the Tier III designation, or will assistance be held up at the point of obligation/equipment transfer?

Answer:

I have directed my team to exercise the State Department's concurrence under 10 U.S.C. 333 in accordance with restrictions imposed under the November 29, 2018, Presidential Memorandum, which applies to new obligations made in FY 2019. The Department of Defense is the agency with further insight on the specific activity referenced in the question.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#93)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Additionally, we understand that CVE assistance for Mauritania has been allowed to proceed, even though it generally involves working with one or more government entities. **Under what exemption (policy or legal) was this allowed?**

Answer:

Ongoing CVE assistance for Mauritania as a part of the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was obligated prior to the beginning of FY 2019 and, therefore, not subject to the current TVPA restrictions. TVPA restrictions under the Presidential Memorandum only apply to the new obligation of certain types of foreign assistance during FY 2019 for the governments of countries listed as Tier 3 in the Department's 2018 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#94)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

The FAA definition also explicitly states that NGO activities are excluded, but there have been numerous reports of NGO programs being impacted by the presidential memorandum. **What is the Department's legal rationale for what constitutes providing assistance to the government of a country? How is this interpretation being implemented in additional waiver decisions? What role, if any, does an NGO coordinated/supporting development program with local vs. national government play in this interpretation?**

Answer:

The restriction under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) applies to assistance for the benefit of the government, regardless of the type of entity implementing the assistance. The State Department and USAID assess whether the restriction applies with respect to a particular program on a case-by-case basis.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#95)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Are NGO implementing partners affected by the presidential memorandum permitted to incur closeout costs for the responsible winding down of any relevant activities?

Answer:

Where an activity will not receive additional funding as a result of the restrictions under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), implementing partners are generally permitted to incur closeout costs to allow for the responsible winding down of the activity.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#96)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

We have heard reports of organizations having to address questions about whether coffee was provided at program workshops where local government partners were present in order to determine the nature of government support. **How is the Department determining what activities constitute government support, particularly in the context of NGO-run programs?**

Answer:

The restriction under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) applies to assistance for the benefit of the government, regardless of the type of entity implementing the assistance. The State Department and USAID assess whether the restriction applies with respect to a particular program on a case-by-case basis.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#97)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Does your interpretation of what constitutes assistance to governments include assistance programs administered through NGOs directly to general populations, where the government does not participate in or receive any kind of financial or in-kind support? If so, why? Given the lack of direct support to a government in these instances, what is the Department's legal rationale for stopping or slowing these programs?

Answer:

The restriction under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) applies to assistance for the benefit of the government, regardless of the type of entity implementing the assistance. The State Department and USAID assess whether the restriction applies with respect to a particular program on a case-by-case basis.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#98)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

We have heard reports from numerous organizations that additional waivers are being considered on a sectoral basis with potentially different criteria across the sectors. For example, some PEPFAR funded programs are being granted waivers – and PEPFAR program models require coordination and some level of integration with Ministries of Health, local governments, and government hospitals. However, some education and civic engagement programs run through local civil society organizations – without the involvement of local or national governments or schools – are being impacted. **What is the explanation for this discrepancy in criteria for providing such waivers?**

Answer:

In connection with the issuance of the November 29, 2018, Presidential Memorandum, the Administration made clear that Departments and agencies should rely on available authorities to provide certain limited types of life-saving assistance in countries that did not receive waivers from the restrictions under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). It also made clear that Departments and agencies should implement the restrictions in a way that is mindful of the impact on people's lives who are served by our life-saving assistance, particularly vulnerable populations in greatest need. I have directed my leadership team to work with State Department and USAID bureaus to follow this approach.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#99)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What is the administration's position on addressing the spread of infectious diseases? Does it view the prevention of the spread of infectious diseases as in the US national interest?

Answer:

Infectious diseases present a risk to U.S. political, economic, and health security. It is in the national security interest of the United States to strengthen global health security and manage these risks. The U.S. government remains committed to preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious disease threats – including through initiatives like the PEPFAR program and the Global Health Security Agenda. The United States utilizes a whole-of-government approach to address infectious disease threats – as outlined in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the U.S. National Biodefense Strategy, and the forthcoming U.S. Global Health Security Strategy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#100)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How has the limited number of waivers in the Presidential Memorandum and the processing of additional waivers delayed obligations or disbursements? Please, identify the accounts, programs, activities and fiscal year of those funds. When are these funds expected to be obligated and disbursed?

Answer:

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) restrictions under the November 29, 2018, Presidential Memorandum apply to the new obligation of certain types of foreign assistance during FY 2019 for the governments of countries listed as Tier 3 in the 2018 TIP report, regardless of the fiscal year of the funds. There is an ongoing process to consider certain limited cases in which it is in our foreign policy and national security interest to continue assistance that would be subject to the TVPA restrictions by relying on available authorities. I look forward to providing you more information as additional decisions are made.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#101)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Are there additional waivers that have been prepared and are awaiting review?

Answer:

I have directed my leadership team to work with State Department and USAID bureaus to explore the use of available authorities in certain limited cases where it is in our foreign policy and national security interest to continue assistance that would otherwise be subject to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) restrictions. That process is ongoing, and I look forward to providing you more information as additional decisions are made.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#102)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Some of the Tier 3 identified countries, including South Sudan and DRC, are also under ongoing foreign aid reviews. **How have the lack of waivers impacted programs on the ground for countries under such reviews?**

Answer:

Restrictions on U.S. assistance to the governments of Tier 3 countries serve as a diplomatic tool to urge action to meet the TVPA's minimum standards. A government's efforts to combat human trafficking is just one factor among many that are taken into account when reviewing how best to use our foreign assistance resources to achieve our national security and foreign policy goals. We recognize the importance of implementing the TVPA foreign assistance restriction in a way that avoids significant adverse effects on vulnerable populations.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#103)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How does the administration plan to manage and improve proactive and timely communication around TIP designation/granting waivers in the future?

Answer:

The Department will work with relevant agencies to identify considerations relevant to the potential waiver of assistance restrictions for Tier 3 governments pursuant to the TVPA. The President will determine whether any waivers of the restriction would promote the purposes of the TVPA or would otherwise be in the U.S. national interest. The President's determinations regarding the imposition and waiver of the TVPA restriction for Tier 3 governments are transmitted to Congress and posted on the White House website.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#104)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What processes will be in place for issuing waivers following the Department's next annual TIP report and tier designations? What are you doing to ensure that waiver process will be efficient, timely and transparent?

Answer:

The Department will work with relevant agencies to identify considerations relevant to the potential waiver of assistance restrictions for the governments of countries listed as Tier 3 in the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, following the transmission of the report to Congress. The President will determine whether any waivers of the restriction would promote the purposes of the TVPA or would otherwise be in the U.S. national interest. The Administration will take into full consideration the implications of such restrictions and justifications for any waivers. As with every year, the Department reviews the process leading to such decisions with a view toward improving the process going forward.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#105)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Please provide a list of State Department staff positions and associated responsibilities that are funded, in whole or in part, by a foreign government.

Answer:

There are five (5) U.S. Direct Hire State Department positions wholly funded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursuant to a Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA) for critical infrastructure protection and public security capacity-building under section 573 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-2) and section 607 (22 U.S.C. 2357) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195). The TCA was signed on May 16, 2008, and extended on January 16, 2013.

Currently, the Government of Saudi Arabia funds salaries and benefits for the following five positions covered by the TCA:

U.S. Direct Hires Under Technical Cooperation Agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia		
Location	Type	Title
Domestic	Civil Service	MANAGEMENT ANALYST
Domestic	Civil Service	DEPUTY UNIT CHIEF
Domestic	Civil Service	ATTORNEY ADVISOR (part time)
Overseas, Saudi Arabia	Foreign Service	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OFFICER
Overseas, Saudi Arabia	Foreign Service	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OFFICER

**Question for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#106)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

You held a telephone press briefing on March 18, 2019, that was focused on international religious freedom but made the briefing available only to faith-based media outlets. **Did any element of the State Department create a transcript or any other recording or summary of the content from this on-the-record phone briefing? Which faiths were represented among the “faith-based” media outlets included in the call? How was participation in this call determined, and by whom?**

Answer:

I have conducted numerous interviews in the past year with a variety of outlets and reporters, including those that regularly cover the Department as well as other media that typically do not have the opportunity to interview a Secretary of State. The Department posts transcripts of press briefings. The March 18 event was an interview with a select group of invited print journalists, not a press briefing. The Department does not normally publish transcripts of interviews with print journalists, as journalists do not always publish in full or at a certain time. This facilitates the ability of media outlets to use material from such interviews at their discretion.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#107)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Please provide the following: The total number of security violations issued to Department employees in 2018, including the number of security violations broken down by Bureau and by Mission. The number of security violations committed by an employee with a history of one or more prior security violations. The number and nature of actions taken by the Department in response to security violations, including: disciplinary actions taken or criminal referrals; and the administration of remedial training in response to any security violation(s).

Answer:

In 2018, the Department adjudicated 28 security violations, some for incidents that occurred prior to 2018. Seven Department employees who received security violations in 2018 had received one or more prior violations. Thirteen employees who had committed security violations were referred to the Bureau of Human Resources (HR) and/or the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) for appropriate action. The Department made no criminal referrals for these security violations and six cases remain open with HR to determine disciplinary action. We instituted a mandatory annual classification and information security course for all employees and contractors and administer remedial security training on a case-by-case basis.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#108)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What has been the Department's total cost of providing security for the Secretary of State by month in 2016, 2017, and 2018?

Answer:

Total security costs depend on the Secretary of State. Historical costs expended for the Secretary's 24/7 Protective Detail are as follows: \$8.6 million (FY 2018); \$9.5 million (FY 2017); and \$14.8 million (FY 2016). Secretary Tillerson's annual at-home security cost was \$3,116,225, with a one-time security countermeasures cost of \$332,000. Secretary Kerry's annual at home security cost was \$3,208,200, with a one-time security countermeasures cost of \$225,000. Secretary Clinton had a one-time security countermeasures cost of \$800 paid by State (USSS paid for her at-home security). Secretary Pompeo's at-home security cost is expected to be \$1,618,879 annually, with a one-time security countermeasures cost of \$274,796.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#109)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What entities at the Department of State and Department of Defense were responsible for organizing the Secretary's housing arrangements on the military base?

Answer:

A number of entities at the Department of State were involved in reviewing arrangements related to the Secretary's housing on the military base, including the Bureau of Administration, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Office of the Legal Adviser. We refer you to the Department of Defense (DOD) to answer your question concerning which DOD entities were responsible for organizing the Secretary's housing on the military base.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#110)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What month/year did the current Secretary move onto the military base? The State Department said the Secretary is paying fair market value. What is his per month cost to rent the home? How did the State Department assess fair market value in this case?

Answer:

The Secretary moved onto the military base in September 2018. The Secretary has his own personal residential lease agreement and the Department does not pay his personal expenses.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#111)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

By what measures have security requirements related to the Secretary changed as a result of this move to housing on a military base?

Answer:

No physical or technical security requirements changed as a result of this move. As the Secretary moved onto a U.S. military base, DS reduced uniformed guard services by 25 percent.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#112)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Date of hearing, March 27, 2019**

Question:

Have you or your staff used WhatsApp or other non-government, third-party platforms to communicate with colleagues or foreign counterparts? If so, how do you maintain these communications for official records purposes? Are you concerned about sensitive messages in non-U.S. government servers?

Answer:

At times Department staff use non-government, third-party platforms to conduct USG business. The Department's mandatory records management training and issued guidance makes clear that all employees have a responsibility to capture federal records into official USG systems. All employees or contractors who create or receive federal records on WhatsApp or other non-government, third-party platforms must: (1) copy an official electronic messaging account in the original transmission of the record; or (2) export and forward a complete copy of the record to his or her official electronic messaging account within 20 days. These messaging apps may not be used to transmit classified or sensitive information.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#113)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

What policy guidance does this administration provide to staff about use of non-US Government systems – including electronic messaging apps – to conduct foreign relations? Does the State Department have a policy and practice of allowing use of these third-party platforms for communication? If so, does the State Department retain copies or recordings of the communications made by State Department employees in the conduct of foreign relations on behalf of the United States?

Answer:

The Department's mandatory records management training and Department-wide issued guidance makes clear that all employees have a responsibility to capture federal records onto official USG systems. The Department currently allows the use of these third party platforms only in limited circumstances. Due to an increased demand to use these platforms in the conduct of the Department's mission, we are exploring the potential impacts of expanding the official use of these platforms, focusing first on our preservation requirements under the Federal Records Act. Department personnel who conduct any USG business on third-party platforms must export all federal records onto Department systems for preservation.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#114)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Mr. Secretary, on March 4, 2019, you received a joint letter from the Chairmen of HFAC, COR, and HPSCI seeking records regarding President Trump's communications with President Putin; to date, the State Department has not furnished any of the requested records, including any created pursuant to its obligations under the Federal Records Act. When you were a member of Congress, you received documents from the Obama Administration of a nature almost identical to the ones sought in the March 4, 2019, letter. These included documents created before, during, and after calls that Secretary Clinton and President Obama had with foreign leaders – including memoranda of conversations from the calls. **What is the legal rationale for the State Department producing such records during the Obama Administration but withholding them during the Trump Administration?**

Answer:

In response to your letter of March 4, 2019, we wrote to you on March 26 concerning this matter, and I refer you to that response.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#115)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

How much has the State Department spent on the Congressional Document Production Unit (CDP) since it was first established in 2015, on staff, document production, and other associated costs respectively? What source of funding was used, and under which authorities? How many FTEs are currently allocated to the CDP? How many of those are currently filled? How many documents have been produced to Congress by the CDP since January 3, 2019? Which committees have received these documents, and how many documents have been provided to each committee?

Answer:

The Department has spent \$3 million on staff and \$5.1 million on document production and other associated costs – for a total of \$8.1 million – on the Congressional Document Production branch (CDP) since it was established in 2015. Funding for the CDP comes from the Diplomatic Programs account. The CDP’s activities are part of the Department’s routine operations. Ten FTEs are allocated to the CDP, of which five are currently filled. The CDP searches, collects, reviews, and organizes documents in response to Congressional requests. It does not itself provide documents directly to Congress. All document productions from the Department are transmitted via the Bureau of Legislative Affairs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#116)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Please provide a list of all current Department employees at the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) or above who have been advised by the Office of the Legal Adviser's Office of Ethics and Financial Disclosures (L/EFD) that they must recuse themselves from involvement in particular matters or subjects while employed by the Department of State. For each such individual, please also provide: (1) a complete description of the terms of said recusal; (2) a description of any incidents in which the Department provided subsequent counseling, feedback, or any other advice to that individual regarding compliance with said recusal; and (3) a description of any monitoring or reporting requirements associated with ensuring that such recusals are honored and adhered to. (Note: To the extent this information includes Personally Identifiable Information (PII), please contact the Committee to make appropriate accommodations in order to ensure its protection.)

Answer:

Federal ethics rules do not require employees to notify the Ethics Office or to make a written record when they recuse from a particular matter. Therefore, the Department does not have a list responsive to this request. Ethics agreements document a commitment to avoid conflicts of interest, but they do not identify particular matters requiring recusal. Financial disclosure review provides an opportunity to discuss potential conflicts with senior employees, and the Ethics Office routinely advises employees when recusal might be appropriate, but written records of an actual recusal decision are not generally required and are not centrally tracked. Compliance with the ethics rules, including recusal when appropriate, is a personal obligation of each Department employee.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#117)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

On January 3, 2018, the State Department reportedly revised the "public charge" provision of the Foreign Affairs Manual (9 FAM 302.8) to make it harder for immigrants to obtain visas if they or their families have used supplemental, non-cash benefits like SNAP and Medicaid. Since the FAM change went into effect, reports indicate that visa denials on public charge grounds have skyrocketed. There have also been reports that immigrants are turning down public benefits because of fear that they will face immigration penalties. **Which officials or staff within the State Department were involved in the decision to revise the Foreign Affairs Manual? To what extent, and how, did State Department officials or staff consult with other federal agencies or offices, including the White House, before making this FAM revision?**

Answer:

The Bureau of Consular Affairs' Visa Office made the revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual guidance on the public charge visa ineligibility. The changes were pursuant to the President's March 6, 2017, Memorandum, "Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening and Vetting of Applications for Visas and Other Immigration Benefits, Ensuring Enforcement of All Laws for Entry into the United States, and Increasing Transparency among Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government and for the American People." Relevant elements of the Executive Branch and relevant offices within the Department of State were consulted prior to publication.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#118)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Does the State Department maintain data concerning the number of visa denials under the “public charge” ground of inadmissibility broken down by racial or ethnic group, consular office, country of origin, or any other categories? If so, please provide those disaggregated figures to the Committee.

Answer:

The Department maintains data associated with immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applicants found ineligible under public charge grounds. Attached are immigrant and nonimmigrant refusals under the public charge ground of inadmissibility aggregated by the nationality of the applicant and the post that adjudicated the visa. The Department does not have data related to the race or ethnicity of applicants refused under the public charge ground of inadmissibility as the Department does not solicit race or ethnicity information from visa applicants. This data represents refusals for FY 2017, FY 2018, and year-to-date for FY 2019.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo by
Representative Eliot Engel (#119)
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2019**

Question:

Has the State Department or individual subcomponents or units of the Department, including individual consular offices, disseminated additional guidance, instructions, memoranda, training, or other information regarding the application of the “public charge” ground of inadmissibility since January 20, 2017? If so, please provide those documents to the Committee.

Answer:

In 2018, the Department of State updated guidance on the public charge inadmissibility in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). Enclosed is a copy of 9 FAM 302.8, Public Charge.